심리학의 원리 심리학의 원리2

So that we might say, by a sort of bad pun, "only a connected world can be known as disconnected." I say bad pun, because the point of view shifts between the connectedness and the disconnectedness. But that carries us beyond the psychological or naturalistic point of view. Categorical unity' and 'transcendental synthesis' would also be good Kantian, but hardly good human, speech. This account of Professor Bain's is, it will be observed, a good specimen of the old-fashioned mode of explaining the several emotions as rapid calculations of results, and the transfer of feeling from one object to another, associated by contiguity or similarity with the first. It were much to be desired that some one might invent a good pair of terms in which to record the distinction--those used in the text are certainly very bad, but Kant's seem to me still worse. Herbart believed in the Soul, too; but for him the 'Self' of which we are 'conscious' is the empirical Self--not the soul. Now what are these? The disconnectedness is of the realities known; the connectedness is of the knowledge of them; and reality and knowledge of it are, from the psychological point of view held fast to in these pages, two different facts.


Let O be the point looked at, M an object farther, and N an object nearer, than it. If the reader will hold his forefingers, one beyond the other, in the median line, and fixate them alternately, he will see the one not looked at, double; and he will also notice that it appears nearer to the plane of the one looked at, whichever the latter may be, than it really is. He has also called attention to the usual inferior moral tone of ordinary planchette writing. Mr. F. W. H. Myers has laid stress on these analogies. Nor can the phenomena involved in these two states of consciousness be adequately expressed, without saying that the belief they include is, that I myself formerly had, or that I myself, and no other, shall hereafter have, the sensations remembered or expected. But the crude explanation of 'two' selves by 'two' hemispheres is of course far from Mr.


Whether these are not only logical possibilities but actual facts is something not yet dogmatically decided in the text. All these are symptoms of agraphic disease. In both these states the content of our mind is in unrest, and the emotion engendered thereby is, like the emotion of belief itself, perfectly distinct, but perfectly indescribable in words. But we no more have conceptions pure than we have pure sensations. Examples of these singular perversions of perception might be multiplied indefinitely, but I have no more space. The thread of consciousness which composes the mind's phenomenal life consist not only of present sensations, but likewise, in part, of memories and expectations. Bain: Emotion and Will, p. The things seen often seem opaque and hide the background upon which they are projected. If, moving first one arm and then another, the blind child gets the same kind of sensation upon the hand, and gets it again as often as he repeats either process, he judges that he has touched the same object by both motions, and concludes that the motions terminate in a common place. If there be such a meaning, or any approach to it (as we are bound to trust there is), it alone can make clear to us why such finite human streams of thought are called into existence in such functional dependence upon brains.


Objects which he screens are seen as if he were transparent. 331. The 'as it were' is delightfully characteristic of the school. The mystery is solved when we note the class to which all these experiences belong. We need no borrowed reflection for these feelings. 561) Mill, speaking of what may rightly be demanded of a theorist, says: "He is not entitled to frame a theory from one class of phenomena, extend it to another class which it does not fit, and excuse himself by saying that if we cannot make it fit, it is because ultimate facts are inexplicable." The class of phenomena which the associationist school takes to frame its theory of the Ego are feelings unaware of each other. The class of phenomena the Ego presents are feelings of which the later ones are intensely aware of those that went before. The fact believed is, that the sensations did actually form, or will hereafter form, part of the self-same series of states, or thread of consciousness, of which the remembrance or expectation of those sensations is the part now present. A person whose visual imagination is strong finds it hard to understand 먹튀카카오 how those who are without the faculty can think a
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